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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic literature abounds as far as studies related to the welfare losses resulting from 
monopolization are concerned. Most of them, however, are analyzed with partial 
equilibrium models. Many authors’ attacks against monopoly conditions are based on the 
deadweight loss effect. As for technical innovation, they argue that while innovation 
reduces the monopolist’s marginal cost and increases the consumer surplus and producer 
surplus in the monopoly market, it causes a much bigger deadweight loss than before; 
and because more resources are seized from the other industries by the monopoly and 
misallocated, the total welfare effect can be negative. In this paper, we attempt to discuss 
this issue with a general equilibrium model. As shall be seen from the following analyses, 
unlike the suggestion by some authors as mentioned above, we show that technical 
innovation by a monopolist actually enhances the general social welfare. 
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Harberger (1954) was one of the pioneers in quantifying welfare losses due to monopoly. 
By adopting a partial equilibrium model that computes welfare losses in terms of the 
profit rate and the price elasticity of demand in an industry, he estimated welfare losses 
from monopoly in the United States in 1954 to be relatively insignificant (approximately 
0.1% of GNP), and economists like Schwartzman (1960), 1  Leibenstein (1966), Bell 
(1968), Scherer (1970), Shepherd (1972), and Worcester (1973) have confirmed his 
results.  
                                                 
1 Using similar estimates as Harburger, Schwartzman (1960) provided concurring conclusions that the 
welfare loss from monopoly had been small, and that income transfers resulting from monopoly were small 
in the aggregate. Even when the elasticity of demand is assumed to be equal two, the welfare loss probably 
was still less than 0.1 percent of the national income in 1954. 
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Harberger’s (1954) findings minimizing welfare loss resulting from monopoly were met 
with considerable criticism. Stigler (1956) and Kamerschen (1966) argued that welfare 
losses due to monopoly pricing might be greater than what Harberger (1954) and 
Schwartzman (1960) computed. Stigler (1956) used Harberger’s (1954) welfare model 
and his own estimates of profits, and assumed a range of reasonable values for the 
elasticity of demand.  He thought the limits within which the monopoly welfare losses 
fell were very large, depending on the extent of actual monopoly power. Using data for 
the years 1956-1957 and 1960-1961, Kamerschen (1966) proposed that the welfare costs 
under monopoly power and mergers had been understated in the earlier studies. Much of 
the earlier work still essentially followed Harberger’s (1954) methodology, except for 
Bergson (1973), who criticized Harburger’s partial equilibrium framework, and put 
forward a general equilibrium model as an alternative. Bergson (1973) showed that the 
estimated welfare loss was heavily dependent on the value of other parameters, such as 
the elasticity of substitution and the distribution of price cost ratios, and his results 
showed that the welfare losses from monopoly were quite large. Bergson’s (1973) 
estimates of maximal welfare loss, though, were countered by others, particularly Carson 
(1975) and Worcester (1975). 
 
Carson (1975) introduced a three-sector economy and estimated a 3.2 percent maximum 
welfare loss due to monopoly, which was considerably bigger than Harberger’s (1954) 
and Schwartzman’s (1960) calculations, but considerably less than Bergson’s (1973) 
maximum estimate.  Based on Harburger’s model and using disaggregated annual data 
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for specific firms, Worcester (1973) presented a “maximum defensible” estimate in the 
private sector of the U.S. economy during 1956-1969 and concluded that welfare loss as a 
result of monopolization was insignificant. Hefford and Round (1978) later accounted for 
the welfare cost of monopoly by applying Harberger’s (1954) estimates and Worcester’s 
(1973) approach in the Australian manufacturing sector for the period 1968-69 to 1974. 
Their results too suggested that only a relatively small proportion of GDP at factor cost 
was accounted for by welfare losses as a consequence of monopoly power.  
 
In contrast, using three independent methods and data sets, Parker and Connor (1979) 
estimated the consumer loss caused by monopoly in the U.S. food-manufacturing 
industries in 1975. They found that consumer losses due to monopoly were around 
US$15 billion or approximately a quarter of U.S. GNP. Virtually all of the consumer loss 
was attributed to income transfers, and 3% to 6% was the result of allocative inefficiency. 
Supporting this, Jenny and Weber (1983) showed the sensitivity of this measure of 
welfare loss based on the French economy. They found considerable allocative welfare 
losses, between 0.85% and 7.39% of GDP, and the welfare loss due to X-inefficiencies 
was as high as 5% of GDP. However, their estimates were highly tentative due to a lack 
of data quality and methodological difficulties.    
 
In addition, Cowling and Mueller (1978) obtained empirical estimates of the social cost 
of monopoly power for both the United States and the United Kingdom. Using a partial 
equilibrium framework, they proved that the costs of monopoly power on an individual 
firm basis were generally large. Attacking such models as yielding overestimates in terms 
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of welfare losses, Littlechild (1981) introduced a model in an uncertain environment and 
argued that windfalls and innovation were more important than monopoly power. He 
suggested that works involving a long-run equilibrium framework in analyzing monopoly 
often failed to include any neutral or socially beneficial interpretation of monopoly.  
 
Friedland (1978) estimated the welfare gains from economy-wide de-monopolization in a 
general equilibrium setting and found that the true welfare loss was consistently lower 
than the partial deadweight loss. Specifically, the size of the welfare gains was dependent 
on the extent of the product substitutability between the monopoly and competitive firms. 
The greater the substitutability, the greater the welfare gains and the less the difference 
between partial and general equilibrium estimates.  This result was supported by Hansen 
(1999), who examined the second-best antitrust issues related to the accuracy of 
estimating the true welfare loss. He too found that the estimate of deadweight loss under 
partial equilibrium was larger than the true loss and the difference between the two 
increased as the specific monopolist being considered became larger.  More recently, by 
adopting a two-good general-equilibrium monopoly production model, Kelton and 
Rebelein (2003) found that social welfare under monopoly was lifted beyond that of 
social welfare when perfect competition prevailed. This was especially true if the 
productivity for the monopolistically produced good is relatively low while the benefit of 
the good is relatively high. Their results showed that the monopoly leads to higher 
equilibrium price and lower equilibrium quantity, generating a smaller welfare for non-
monopolists, and a larger welfare for monopolists than with perfect competition.  
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As mentioned earlier, some economists proposed that the traditional analysis of 
monopoly pricing underestimated the social costs of monopoly. Under the perfectly 
discriminating model, Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) argued that 
since the whole rent might be dissipated in a competitive process, the full monopoly 
profit should be added to the social cost of monopoly. Tullock (1967) maintained that the 
social costs of monopoly should include resources used to obtain monopolies and their 
opportunity costs while Posner (1975) argued that they should include the high costs of 
public regulation.  Koo (1970) also asserted that other than the loss of consumers’ surplus 
net of the monopolist’s gain in profits, the social opportunity loss of the monopolist as a 
result of the inefficient use of resources should be included in calculating the social cost 
of monopoly. Even if economies of scale result in lower production costs, the opportunity 
loss to society because of operating below optimum still exists. However, Shepherd 
(1972) claimed that the net social loss stemmed from the failure of the monopoly to price 
efficiently, and not from the resulting loss as a consequence of the monopolization of a 
competitive industry.  Lee and Brown (2005) thought the conventional deadweight loss 
measure of the social cost of monopoly ignored the social cost of inducing competition.  
Using an applied general equilibrium model, they proposed a social cost metric where the 
benchmark is the Pareto optimal state of the economy instead of simply being 
competitive markets.  
 
Oliver Williamson (1968a, 1968b, 1969a, 1969b) investigated the welfare trade-offs 
related to horizontal mergers. Merger can result in higher efficiency and lower costs, or 
greater market power and higher prices. Welfare gains associated with reductions in cost 
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typically outweighed the welfare losses imposed on consumers by the greater market 
power, thus, leading to a net increase in social welfare.  Innovation enables monopolists 
to lower their costs, to expand their output and to reduce their prices; hence it is 
conventional to conclude that social welfare unambiguously increases as a result. 
However, DePrano and Nugent (1969) pointed out that in Williamson’s (1968a) model, a 
fixed value for elasticity was used, but if a merger resulted in a movement along the 
demand curve instead of a shift of the demand curve, the value of the elasticity would be 
different. They further showed that if elasticity factors were low, it would be unlikely for 
a small merger to actually experience positive welfare effects.  
 
Geroski (1990) further listed three reasons to expect a negative direct effect of monopoly 
on innovation: (1) the absence of active competitive forces, (2) an increase in the number 
of firms searching for an innovation, and (3) incumbent monopolists enjoying a lower net 
return from introducing a new innovation (Arrow, 1962; Fellner, 1951; Delbono and 
Denicolo, 1991).  In addition, Reksulak et al. (2005) argued that cost-saving innovation 
raised the opportunity cost of monopoly.  As a monopolist with market power became 
more efficient, greater amounts of surplus were sacrificed by consumers since the former 
increasingly failed to produce the new and larger competitive output. Thus, innovation 
elevates the social value of competition by raising the deadweight cost of monopoly. 
They further contended that even without a rise in market power, the consumer welfare 
sacrificed under the monopolist would still be larger than under the prevalence of 
competitive firms.  In evaluating the monopoly-related welfare losses, Kay (1983) 
incorporated factors of production in a general equilibrium context and found that the 
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summation of partial equilibrium estimates was likely to be inaccurate as an indicator of 
summed welfare costs. In the case where there were no constraints on the exercise of 
monopoly power, simple estimates for summing up the losses could be derived from the 
general equilibrium model, and these estimates suggested that welfare losses were 
potentially large.   
 
Some literature addresses the labor-managed behavior of a monopolist in a partial 
equilibrium setting. According to Hill and Waterson (1983), the labor-managed industry 
equilibrium produced less output, hence less welfare, than its profit-maximizing 
counterpart if firms were symmetric. Neary (1984, 1985) showed that small levels of 
output could lead to an increased number of firms in labor-managed equilibrium if firms 
were asymmetric in relation to technology and/or demand. Using a general equilibrium 
model, Neary (1992) showed that under certain circumstances the equilibrium of the 
labor-managed economy could include more firms and result in higher welfare than the 
profit-maximizing one.  If profits were positive, the labor-managed firms would not 
provide full employment. The entry of new firms can reduce the unemployment and the 
wage rate leading to lower total utility, but more utility from consumption could lead to a 
greater total utility.  
 
We now present our model with capital as the single input in the next section. Then, in 
section 4, we consider a numerical example, and a brief concluding remark follows in 
section 5.  
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III.   A MODEL WITH CAPITAL AS THE SINGLE INPUT 
Consider a two-sector economy with a competitive industry that includes many firms and 
an industry with a single-firm monopoly. The competitive industry consists of m identical 
small firms, of which each produces the same product good 1, using the same input of 
natural resources (for example, land, and it will be referred to as capital), having the 
same production function q )(kφ= , where k is the amount of capital input. The 
monopolist produces good 2 with the same capital input, and its production function is Q 
= Φ(K).   
 
There are M identical consumers, each having the same utility function u = u(x1, x2), and 
where xj is the amount of good j consumed, j = 1, 2. Each consumer has an equal profit 
share from each and every firm, and all shares combined together comprise the first part 
of his income. The total amount of natural resource available in this economy is C, and 
each individual has an equal share of ownership. The second part of income for each 
consumer is therefore from renting his natural resource to the firms. 
 
Let K be the amount of capital employed by the monopolist, and k the amount of capital 
demanded by each competitive firm. Because capital does not directly generate 
consumption utility, every single individual is ready to rent out his capital share to the 
firms as long as the rental price is positive. As a result, the rental price of the capital must 
clear the capital market: K + mk = C.  In other words, when the monopolist chooses an 
amount K of capital, the rental price of the capital will be adjusted until each competitive 
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firm in the first industry chooses 
m
KCk −=  as capital input for profit maximization. We 
denote the capital rental price by v(K). Therefore the decision of the monopolist is in 
essence a strategic decision, and this is the main difference between our model and the 
classical GE model in which every individual is just a price-taker. 
 
On the other hand, the price of good 2 depends on the quantity produced by the 
monopolist, which in turn depends on the capital amount he employs. As a result the 
price of good 2 depends on K, and we write it as P(K). As for the competitive industry 
that produces good 1, each single firm is a price taker in both the output market and the 
input market, taking the price of its output and the capital rental price as given. For 
simplicity, in the following discussion good 1’s price p is normalized to 1 as the 
numeraire, and v(K) and P(K) are all measured relative to it.  
 
The decision of the monopoly is to choose the capital stock K such that: 
 
KKvKKP )()()(Max −Φ=Π               (1) 
 
Note that the price P(K) of good 2 depends on K -- it is not viewed as given as in most 
classical general equilibrium models. It is this non-price-taking feature that makes our 
model different from other classical general equilibrium models, and as a result of that, it 
makes the required mathematical computation more complicated. 
 
The decision of each small firm is: 
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kKvk )()(Max −=φπ                      (2)  
 
Given (1) and (2), the profit income for each consumer is thus: 
 
      
M
kKvkmKKvKP
M
m ))()(()()( −+−
=
+Π φπ  
 
And the resource rental income for each consumer is: 
  
M
mkKKv ))(( +  
 
The decision of each consumer is thus 
 
 Max  ),( 21 xxu
s.t.       
M
mkKKvkKvkmKKvKPxKPx ))(())()(()()()( 21
++−+−
=+
φ              (3) 
 
Definition 1. An equilibrium of this two-sector economy consists of (i)  capital rental 
amounts , (ii) a price vector , and (iii) the individual 
consumption of goods such that (a) (1)(2)(3) are solved with , 
, ; and (b) all markets are cleared: 
, , . 
),( ** kK ))(),(,1( ** KvKP
),( **1 2xx
**, kkKK ==
)()(),()( ** KvKvKPKP == **11 22, xxxx ==
)( **1 kmMx φ= )(
**
2 KMx Φ= CKmk =+
**
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Definition 2. A technical innovation by the monopolist is the development of a new 
production function such that )(KQ Ψ= )()( KK Φ>Ψ  for all K. 
 
What we are going to establish: 
 
Theorem 1. Suppose in the economy as described above, the utility function of each 
consumer is strongly increasing. Suppose the new production technique ψ(K) is constant 
returns to scale, or increasing returns to scale when K ≤ C. And suppose that, after the 
innovation, the equilibrium output by the monopolist is larger than that which it was 
before the innovation. Then, ignoring the research and development (R&D) costs for 
technical innovation,2 the welfare effect of the innovation is positive. 
 
It seems obvious to some economists that technical innovation always leads to higher 
welfare effects. Their views are based on a partial equilibrium model, in which 
innovation in one industry will result in higher output in the particular industry but 
leaving outputs from other industries unaffected. As a result of innovation, consumers 
will end up consuming more goods produced by the innovating industry without reducing 
their consumption of the other goods.  
 
                                                 
2 In our discussion, for simplicity, we do not consider the R&D costs of technical innovation. The R&D 
costs are paid for just one period, while the consumers’ utility gains caused by innovation, if they do exist, 
will last for a lifetime. In this sense the R&D costs can be neglected if future utility is not too substantially 
discounted. 
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However, this partial equilibrium analysis is not precise because the innovation carried 
out by one industry may change the resource allocation across the whole economy. In 
other words, more resources will be used by the innovating industry for production, 
leaving less for the other industries. Therefore in this economy some goods are produced 
in greater amounts than before the innovation, but some other goods are produced in 
smaller amounts than before the innovation. After the innovation, consumers consume 
greater amounts of some goods but smaller amounts of the others. Thus the total welfare 
effect is unclear. That explains why some other economists attempt to argue that 
monopoly innovation may lead to negative welfare effects. According to their belief, 
when more resources are used by the monopoly, it will significantly increase the 
deadweight loss. At the same time, the outputs produced by the other industries can also 
be significantly reduced.  In terms of social welfare, this may not be compensated 
sufficiently by the increase in the monopoly outputs, and will eventually lead to a 
reduction of consumer utility. 
 
It would be easier to show that innovation leads to higher welfare if the innovation were 
carried out by all the firms in a competitive industry.  This result can be derived directly 
from the First Welfare Theorem. However, due to the existence of monopoly power in 
our case, the First Welfare Theorem no longer applies. In order to prove this result, we 
need to make stronger assumptions and provide more subtle arguments -- though the 
procedure looks similar to the proof of the First Welfare Theorem.  
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Proof:  In the following section, we use * and ** to denote respectively the equilibrium 
quantities before and after the innovation.  According to our assumption, it holds that 
. There are two cases: (a)  but  (due to higher 
productivity after the innovation), and (b) .  
)()( *** KK Φ>Ψ *** KK ≤ )()( *** KK Φ>Ψ
*** KK >
 
In case (a), at the equilibrium, good 1’s total quantity is not reduced because the total 
capital utilized by the competitive industry is either the same as or bigger than before the 
innovation, while on the other hand the amount of good 2 produced in the economy is 
larger. Obviously in this case each consumer achieves a higher equilibrium utility.  
 
The argument for case (b) is a bit more complicated. Assume that, with the new 
production technique of , the new equilibrium of this two-sector economy is 
characterized by (i) , (ii) , and (iii) . We need to 
show that .  
Ψ
),( **** kK *))*(),(,1( ** KvKP ),( **2
**
1 xx
),(),( *2
*
1
**
2
**
1 xxuxxu >
 
Assume by contradiction that this conclusion were not true and thus 
. We first consider a feasible allocation of the economy under the 
production technique of Ψ . Imagine the monopolist and all the competitive firms no 
longer care for profit-maximization and maintain the optimal decision like in the old days 
with and , then while each competitive firm produces the same output of 
good 1 also as in earlier times, the monopolist now produces a bigger output of good 2 
because of the new technology. Assume that the goods are equally shared by each 
),(),( *2
*
1
**
2
**
1 xxuxxu ≤
*KK = *kk =
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consumer. Then each consumer consumes the same amount of good 1 as before but a bit 
more of good 2 than in by-gone times. Let the consumption vector of each consumer be 
. In view of the strongly increasing property of the utility function u, we must 
have , which, together with our assumption in the beginning of this 
paragraph, implies .    
),( 2
*
1 xx ′
),(),( 2
*
1
*
2
*
1 xxuxxu ′<
),(),( 2
*
1
**
2
**
1 xxuxxu ′<
 
According to the definition of equilibrium,  must not be feasible under the price 
system and the individual income at the new equilibrium, i.e.,  
),( 2
*
1 xx ′
*))*(),(,1( ** KvKP
      
M
CKvkKvkfmKKvKKPxKPx *)*(*)**)*(*)*((***)*(*)*(*)*(*)*( 2
*
1
+−+−Ψ
>′+
  =   
M
kmfKKP *)*(*)*(*)*( +Ψ                                 (4) 
 
On the other hand, we have, 
M
Kx
M
kmfx *)(' ,*)( 2
*
1
Ψ
== , and therefore 
 
M
kmfKKPxKPx *)(*)(*)*(*)*( 2
*
1
+Ψ
=′+                                                           (5) 
 
Combining (4) and (5) one derives: 
 
*)*(*)*(*)*(*)(*)(*)*( kmfKKPkmfKKP +Ψ>+Ψ                                     (6) 
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Note that  
 
        ****** mkKmkKC +=+=
 
Thus  
 
       ***)*(***)*(**)*(**)*( kKmvKKvkKmvKKv +=+                                    (7) 
 
Subtracting (7) from (6) side by side: 
 
*]**)*(*)*([*]**)*(*)*(*)*([
*]*)*(*)([*]*)*(*)(*)*([
kKvkfmKKvKKP
kKvkfmKKvKKP
−+−Ψ
>−+−Ψ
                            (8) 
 
However, given the rental price v(K**), k** is optimal capital rental for every 
competitive firm for profit maximization. As a result the second term in the right hand 
side of (8) is greater than the second term in its left hand side. We then must have 
 
***)*(*)*(*)*(**)*(*)(*)*( KKvKKPKKvKKP −Ψ>−Ψ                          (9) 
 
On the other hand, let a = *
**
K
K  > 1. By the assumption of constant returns to scale or 
increasing returns to scale of , we have , and as a result, Ψ )()( *** KaK Ψ≥Ψ
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*]*)*(*)(*)*([**)*(*)(*)*(***)*(*)*(*)*( KKvKKPaaKKvKaKPKKvKKP −Ψ>−Ψ>−Ψ
                 (10)  
 
Note that as a > 1, a contradiction between (9) and (10) is thus obtained. As a result, in 
case (b) we must also have . Theorem 1 is thereby proven. □ ),(),( *2
*
1
**
2
**
1 xxuxxu >
 
IV.  A  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE   
Consider an economy with a competitive industry that includes many firms and an 
industry with a single monopoly firm. The competitive industry consists of m identical 
small firms, of which each produces the same product good 1, using the same input of 
natural resources (for example, land, and remember will be referred to as capital), having 
the same production function q = k , where k is the amount of capital input. The 
monopolist produces good 2 with the capital input, and its production function is Q = tK, 
where K is the capital input, and t > 0 is a parameter representing the level of technology.   
 
There are M identical consumers, each having the same utility function u = )1( 21 +xx , 
where xj is the amount of good j consumed. The asymmetric feature of the utility function 
implies that good 1 is a subsistence good, the consumption of it being required to survive 
(for example, basic food); on the other hand, the consumption of good 2 increases the 
utility from each unit of good 1 consumed; good 2 itself not being a subsistence good. 
(Note:  In reality, a subsistence good such as food is hardly provided by a single private 
firm. Otherwise for profit maximization the monopolist would charge an extremely high 
price and would produce a very tiny amount).  Each consumer has an equal profit share 
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from each and every firm, and all shares combined together consist as part of his income. 
The total natural resource available in this economy is C, and each individual has an 
equal share. The other part of the income for each consumer is therefore from renting his 
natural resource to the firms. 
 
Let 1 be the price of good 1, and let v(K) be the rental rate of capital.  
 
The decision of each small firm is: 
 
kKvk )(Max −=π                         (11) 
  
from which one solves .
)(4
1 and ,
)(2
1,
)]([4
1
2 KvKv
q
Kv
k === π  
 
The decision of the monopoly is to choose the capital stock K such that: 
 
KKvtKKPKKvtKP )())(()()(Max −=−=Π                             (12) 
 
According to the assumption on profit share, the income of each and every consumer is 
M
KKvtKKP
Kv
m )()(
)(4
−+
. The income from the renting of natural resources for each 
individual is 
M
KCv )( . It is easy to verify that the individual quantity demand for good 1 
and that for good 2 are, respectively: 
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)(5.0
)()(
)(4
)(5.0
1 KPM
KKvtKKP
Kv
mKCv
x +
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−++
=          (13)   
 
5.0
)(
)()(
)(4
)(5.0
2 −⋅
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−++
=
KPM
KKvtKKP
Kv
mKCv
x           (14) 
 
The total quantity demanded for good 2 is then:  
 
M
KP
KKvtKKP
Kv
mKCv
Mx 5.0
)(
)()(
)(4
)(5.0
2 −
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−++
=          (15)        
 
For market clearing, it must hold that 
 
M
KP
KKvtKKP
Kv
mKCv
tK 5.0
)(
)()(
)(4
)(5.0
−
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−++
=                     (16)
   
from which one can solve 
 
[ ]
))((4
)()(4)(
2
tKMKv
KCKvmKP
+
−+
=              (17)
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On the other hand, for capital market clearing: 
 
[ ]
C
Kv
mK =+ 2)(4
                                                     (18)
      
Thus  
[ ]
KC
mKv
−
=2)(4 ,     
KC
mKv
−
=
2
)(           (19)  
 
Combining these results, we get:  
 
      
tKM
KCmKP
+
−
=
)()(               (20)
  
      K
KC
mtK
tKM
KCm
K
−
−
+
−
=Π
2
)(
)(                        (21)    
 
The first order condition reads: 
0)(2)(4)(62)(4 22222232 =−++−−−++−+ KCMKMKCMtKKCMtMtKKKCtKt     
         (22)   
The solution is K = K*(M, C, t). 
 
Note that  
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M
KCm
x
)(
1
−
= ,   
M
tKMx +=+12                        (23)
  
As a result,  
 
      
M
KCmtKMu
4/12/1 )]([)( −+
=                                                                                    (24) 
 
Now let us assume that M = 10,000, C = 10,000, and m = 100. Then equation (22) 
becomes, 
0)10(10210)10(104)10(106102)10(4 488244442424232 =−×++−×−−×+×+−+ KKKttKKtKKKtKt
                                     (25) 
Assuming the values of t are between the range of 1 to 2, then solving for the 
corresponding values of K and u using numerical techniques, the relationship between t 
and u can be derived as shown (see Figure 1 on page 28). 
 
From Figure 1 we observe that u increases together with t. Thus we have 
 
Proposition 1. In our model with capital as the single input, as the technology of the 
monopolist advances while more resources are used by the monopoly instead of by the 
competitive firms, the social welfare is increased (see Figure 2 on page 29). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Most of the criticism against monopoly is based on its deadweight loss. With partial 
equilibrium models, some authors argue that because more resources are used by the 
monopoly, innovation introduced by a monopolist could generate substantial deadweight 
loss and hence could lead to negative welfare effects. Our modeling and analysis have 
proven otherwise.  Although our analysis is based on a simple model with some specific 
assumptions, we believe our conclusion that technical innovations brought about by a 
monopoly increase overall social welfare is generally correct – as long as the monopoly 
profits are shared by the vast majority.  
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Figure 1.  Relationship between the level of technology and utility. 
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Figure 2.  Relationship between the level of technology and capital.  
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